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Corporate illegality is often attributed to greed by corporate managers
and insufficient legal safeguards. Underlying this argument is an explicit
critique of corporate crime regulatory systems. Yet there is little systematic
investigation of the relative merits of different types or components of
crime-control strategies; research comparing more punitive command-andcontrol strategies with self-regulatory approaches is particularly lacking.
In this Article, we assess these crime prevention-and-control mechanisms in
the context of individual and situational risk factors that may increase the
likelihood of illegal behavior in the environmental arena. We use data
drawn from two groups of business managers who participated in a
factorial survey (using vignettes) measuring their intentions to participate
in two types of environmental offenses. Generally, results show that the
most effective regulatory levers are (1) credible legal sanctions and (2) the
certainty and severity of informal discovery by significant others in the
firm. We conclude by discussing the implications of our findings for
regulatory policy and strategy, and for efforts to account for the role of
social norms in corporate environmental compliance.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a subtype of white-collar crime, corporate crime is typically
understood to involve illegal behavior by firms and their agents (executives
and managers) in the pursuit of corporate benefit.1 Criminologists
recognize that even though corporations as juridical persons can be charged
with illegal activity, corporations per se do not “act.” Rather, managers
make decisions and act on behalf of the company. As corporate “actors,”
managers also are potentially subject to sanctions for their participation in
or knowledge of corporate illegality.2
Enforcement provisions for
environmental crime allow criminal prosecution, in addition to
administrative and civil sanctions, against both corporations and
responsible corporate officers.3
Most corporate crime research focuses on firm, industry, and manager
1

See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CORPORATE CRIME IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 6
(1984). This definition does not preclude the notion that self-interest may be an indirect
cause and consequence of corporate crime in that managers who “problem solve”
successfully, albeit illegally, may reap rewards as an aftereffect.
2
See Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability,
23 J. LEGAL STUD. 833, 834 (1994); Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence
of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1281, 1284 (2011).
3
See Dorothy Thornton et al., General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental
Behavior, 27 LAW & POL’Y 262, 263–64 (2005).
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attributes to differentiate offenders from nonoffenders.4 While this
approach is a reasonable one, it often leaves out an important characteristic
associated with company (and employee) compliance: the regulatory
environment. Specifically, the regulatory environment influences and
shapes criminal opportunities through punishment (or the threat of it) and
socialization.5
Putatively, command-and-control policies—compliance rules imposed
and “policed” by the government with an emphasis on punitive sanctions
for violators—influence corporate crime because corporate managers are
instrumental actors.6 Decisions and actions flow from a cost–benefit
assessment of both the pecuniary and nonpecuniary pros and cons
associated with illegal activity. If the benefits of crime are high and the risk
of discovery and punishment is low, then criminal opportunities increase as
actors perceive less risk associated with illegal activities.7
Another regulatory strategy shifts the primary mechanism of
compliance away from the government to the organization itself and to
individual actors within it. This approach is less reliant on formal
regulation (although the government often plays a secondary role through
“enforced” self-regulation) and builds on what Braithwaite has called a
4

See MARSHALL B. CLINARD & PETER C. YEAGER, CORPORATE CRIME 43–53 (1980);
EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE COLLAR CRIME 17–28 (1949); DAVID WEISBURD ET AL.,
WHITE-COLLAR CRIME AND CRIMINAL CAREERS 143–49 (2001); Cindy R. Alexander & Mark
A. Cohen, Why Do Corporations Become Criminals? Ownership, Hidden Actions, and
Crime as an Agency Cost, 5 J. CORP. FIN. 1, 2–5 (1999); Kristy Holtfreter, Is Occupational
Fraud “Typical” White-Collar Crime? A Comparison of Individual and Organizational
Characteristics, 33 J. CRIM. JUST. 353, 354–56 (2005).
5
See MICHAEL L. BENSON & SALLY S. SIMPSON, WHITE-COLLAR CRIME: AN
OPPORTUNITY PERSPECTIVE 193–94 (2009); Henry C. Finney & Henry R. Lesieur, A
Contingency Theory of Organizational Crime, in 1 RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
ORGANIZATIONS 255, 255 (Samuel B. Bacharach ed., 1982).
6
See generally NEAL SHOVER & ANDY HOCHSTETLER, CHOOSING WHITE-COLLAR CRIME
168 (2006) (developing the authors’ theory, which assumes a rational actor model, and
opining that sanctions do not work because the command-and-control model is not
successfully implemented); Gilbert Geis, Is Incarceration an Appropriate Sanction for the
Nonviolent White-Collar Offender?, in CONTROVERSIAL ISSUES IN CORRECTIONS 152
(Charles B. Fields ed., 1999) (arguing yes).
7
See Mark A. Cohen & Sally S. Simpson, The Origins of Corporate Criminality:
Rational Individual and Organizational Actors, in DEBATING CORPORATE CRIME 33, 36
(William S. Lofquist et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter Cohen & Simpson, Origins of Corporate
Criminality] (extending the economic model to incorporate nonpecuniary costs and benefits
such as informal reputation sanctions); Mark A. Cohen, Environmental Crime and
Punishment: Legal/Economic Theory and Empirical Evidence on Enforcement of Federal
Environmental Statutes, 82 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1054, 1063–64 (1992) [hereinafter
Cohen, Environmental Crime and Punishment] (providing a formal economic model of the
costs and benefits of illegal corporate environmental behavior).
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“family model” of crime control.8
Good corporate citizens are firms whose managers, when confronted with corporate
criminal opportunities, will be guided by a sense of right and wrong, by their
understanding of how others are likely to view their behavior, and by the extent to
9
which they think the discovery of these acts would bring shame on their companies.

Effective self-regulation by firms (ethics programs, internal compliance
mechanisms, and sensitivity to informal sanctions) should narrow criminal
opportunities.
In the corporate crime literature, there has been extensive discussion
and debate about different regulatory strategies but far too little systematic
investigation of the relative merits of each, and few have taken into account
the range of solutions that can be included in regulatory policy.10
Consequently, scholars and policymakers know very little about “what
works, what doesn’t, and what’s promising” regarding corporate crimecontrol strategies.11 In the current study, we offer some empirical insight
into this question.
In this Article, we examine the prevention and control of corporate
environmental crime in the context of individual and firm-level
characteristics that have been linked conceptually and empirically to
corporate crime. Specifically, we focus on the extent to which decisions by
managers to violate environmental laws are affected by command-andcontrol or self-regulation prevention-and-control strategies, controlling for
known risk factors for crime. This research improves on the prior literature
in several ways. Much of the corporate crime literature relies heavily on
official data sources.
As criminologists are well aware, official
observations are limited to illegal acts recorded by enforcement agents and
neglect those acts that do not come to the attention of authorities. Of equal
importance, these data sources do not allow researchers to learn what
managers are actually thinking, leaving the intra-organizational
decisionmaking process virtually uninvestigated. The current study
addresses both of these issues by using data from a factorial survey to
examine managerial decisionmaking within a corporate context. Our goal
is to determine the extent to which regulatory strategies are effective in the
8

See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME AND REINTEGRATION 54–68 (1989).
Sally S. Simpson et al., The Social Control of Corporate Criminals: Shame and
Informal Sanction Threats, in OF CRIME & CRIMINALITY: THE USE OF THEORY IN EVERYDAY
LIFE 141, 142 (Sally S. Simpson ed., 2000).
10
See NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET AL., SMART REGULATION: DESIGNING ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY 37–88 (1998).
11
LAWRENCE W. SHERMAN ET AL., NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, PREVENTING CRIME: WHAT
WORKS, WHAT DOESN’T, WHAT’S PROMISING (1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf
files/171676.PDF.
9
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context of situational and individual pushes/pulls toward illegal behavior.
In Part II of this Article, we describe the regulatory context and review
previous research on environmental noncompliance. We focus particularly
on organizational and individual factors that increase the risk of crime. In
Part III, we describe the current research design and research participants.
Part IV contains our analysis and results. We conclude, in Part V, with a
discussion of the findings, particularly their implications for successful
regulatory regimes.
II. PRIOR LITERATURE
A. REGULATORY STRATEGIES AND CORPORATE OFFENDING
Regulatory strategies often overlap. Regulatory instruments and
institutions are interconnected,12 and some strategies, such as responsive
regulation, are built around the argument that “regulatory policy should
take neither a solely deterrent nor a solely cooperative approach.”13
Although it is somewhat simplistic to classify regulation into distinct
types,14 Gunningham, Grabosky, and Sinclair argue that it is useful to
examine both the prevention and control capacities of different regulatory
strategies given that “a particular instrument which may appear attractive,
when looked at on its own, may work quite differently when introduced
alongside others.”15 Below, we identify the key components of two
regulatory strategies (command-and-control and self-regulation) and
highlight how each is expected to or has been shown to affect corporate
crime prevention and control.16 In addition, we discuss the important role

12

See GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 10, at 37–38.
Vibeke Lehmann Nielsen & Christine Parker, Testing Responsive Regulation in
Regulatory Enforcement, 3 REG. & GOVERNANCE 376, 376 (2009).
14
See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 17–18 (1992).
15
GUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 10, at 132.
16
See Cohen & Simpson, Origins of Corporate Criminality, supra note 7, at 34–35. The
regulation literature is cross-disciplinary and extensive. There are many other relevant
components of regulatory policy that could be considered here, such as the influence of
nongovernmental organizations and corporate gatekeepers on firm compliance. See, e.g.,
JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 15–54
(2006); Bridget M. Hutter & Clive J. Jones, Business Risk Management Practices: The
Influence of State Regulatory Agencies and Non-State Sources 17 (Ctr. for Analysis of Risk
and Regulation at the London Sch. of Econ. and Political Sci., Discussion Paper No. 41,
2006). Other components to consider are the barriers to compliance posed by regulatory
accretion. See generally J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Mozart and the Red Queen: The
Problem of Regulatory Accretion in the Administrative State, 91 GEO. L.J. 757 (2003)
(discussing this concept). Our aims are more modest. We wish to better understand how
13
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of informal sanctions either as a control mechanism that can be triggered by
command-and-control interventions or as complementary with selfregulatory strategies.
1. Command and Control
In command-and-control strategies, legal authorities dictate the terms
of compliance, relying on the threat of formal legal sanctions to achieve
compliance with those terms.17 High detection risk coupled with certain
and severe punishments should deter most offenders. Empirically,
however, the story is more complicated than this. Some research supports
the contention that punitive sanctions affect firm and plant behavior, but
findings overall are mixed. Cohen, for instance, finds that Coast Guard
inspections and monitoring reduce spills at the firm level (a general
deterrence effect) and that the frequency of inspection is more important
than sanction severity.18 Simpson, Garner, and Gibbs find little evidence
that sanctions of any type (e.g., inspections, informal or formal
interventions) associated with Clean Water Act enforcement inhibit
reoffending (i.e., specific deterrence).19
Plant-level studies more
consistently show a specific deterrence effect associated with
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) monitoring and enforcement, and
a recent review of the empirical literature on enforcement, conducted by
Gray and Shimshack, finds both specific and general deterrence associated
with environmental monitoring and enforcement.20
specific mechanisms associated with two regulatory strategies affect the way managers think
and may behave. In this regard, our work helps to fill an empirical deficit noted by Hutter
and Jones:
We know that the sources of regulation and risk management are diversifying, as are the tools
and techniques employed to manage and regulate risks. What we do not have is much
empirically informed research about the range of sources influencing the business world and in
particular the weighting of influence exercised by them.

Hutter & Jones, supra, at 1.
17
See Clifford Rechtschaffen, Deterrence vs. Cooperation and the Evolving Theory of
Environmental Enforcement, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1181, 1187–90 (1998).
18
Mark A. Cohen, Empirical Research on the Deterrent Effect of Environmental
Enforcement and Monitoring, 30 ENVTL. L. REP. 10245, 10246 (2000).
19
See SALLY S. SIMPSON ET AL., WHY DO CORPORATIONS OBEY ENVIRONMENTAL LAW?
ASSESSING PUNITIVE AND COOPERATIVE STRATEGIES OF CORPORATE CRIME CONTROL 2
(2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/220693.pdf.
20
See generally Cohen, supra note 18, at 10246 (providing evidence that environmental
monitoring and enforcement serves both specific and general deterrence functions); Wayne
B. Gray & Mary E. Deily, Compliance and Enforcement: Air Pollution Regulation in the
U.S. Steel Industry, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 96 (1996) (discussing how mill
compliance with air pollution regulations was associated with substantial regulatory
activity—inspections or other enforcement actions); Wayne B. Gray & Jay P. Shimshack,
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Scenario-based survey research, which largely focuses on
environmental and other forms of corporate offending (e.g., bribery, sales
fraud, price-fixing), shows that current and prospective managers report
reasonably high expectations that corporate crimes will be discovered by
legal authorities and that ensuing sanctions will be costly, particularly when
individuals (as opposed to the company) are targeted.21 Thus, commandand-control strategies based on discovery and punishment should lower
corporate offending. But once again, the relationship is far from
straightforward. In one study, threats of formal sanctions are mediated
through individual characteristics such as morality22 and outcome
expectations.23 Formal punishments are less relevant once informal
consequences are included in the analysis.24
2. Self-Regulation
Self-regulatory approaches (typically offered as a complementary
strategy in conjunction with government-enforced regulation) presume that
prosocial norms and values coupled with effective internal compliance
systems (e.g., clear accountability, communication of expectations,
effective monitoring, and appropriate reprimands when violations occur)
will secure compliance.25 Braithwaite’s “family model” of self-regulation
The Effectiveness of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement: A Review of the Empirical
Evidence, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y 3 (2011) (providing a summary of the empirical
literature on the impact of environmental monitoring and enforcement on plant/facility-level
compliance); Benoît Laplante & Paul Rilstone, Environmental Inspections and Emissions of
the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec, 31 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 19 (1996) (discussing
how both the inspection and threat of inspection have a strong negative impact on plant-level
pollution emissions); Wesley A. Magat & W. Kip Viscusi, Effectiveness of the EPA’s
Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards, 33 J.L. & ECON. 331
(1990) (discussing how water pollution inspection and enforcement have a strong effect on
pollution and rates of compliance); Louis W. Nadeau, EPA Effectiveness at Reducing the
Duration of Plant-Level Noncompliance, 34 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 54 (1997)
(explaining that the EPA is effective at reducing the length of time plants are out of
compliance).
21
See SALLY S. SIMPSON, CORPORATE CRIME, LAW, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 35–44 (2002).
22
See Raymond Paternoster & Sally Simpson, Sanction Threats and Appeals to
Morality: Testing a Rational Choice Model of Corporate Crime, 30 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 549,
554 (1996).
23
See N. Craig Smith, Sally S. Simpson & Chun-Yao Huang, Why Managers Fail to Do
the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of Unethical and Illegal Conduct, 17 BUS. ETHICS Q.
633, 638–39 (2007).
24
See Lori A. Elis & Sally S. Simpson, Informal Sanction Threats and Corporate
Crime: Additive Versus Multiplicative Models, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 399, 414–17
(1995).
25
See David B. Spence, The Shadow of the Rational Polluter: Rethinking the Role of
Rational Actor Models in Environmental Law, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 993–98 (2001).
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rejects the economically rational conception of the firm and its managers
found in command-and-control approaches to crime control.26 Instead,
company self-regulation also accounts for the notion of organizational
social responsibility and the prosocial norms and ethical values of company
managers. Thus, managers’ perceptions of the ethical climate of a firm
should affect their own offending intentions.
Evidence suggests that managers who believe that the corporate
culture is tolerant of illegality are more likely to violate regulations.27
Similarly, a recent meta-analysis found that ethics codes supported and
enforced by top management have a positive, significant effect on ethical
decisionmaking and conduct within companies.28 Research also indicates
that a positive compliance culture at the firm level may be transmitted from
a parent company to the plant level.29
3. Informal Sanctions
Informal sanctions (e.g., extralegal costs) are regulatory levers
associated with both firm self-regulation and command-and-control
strategies, depending on the mechanism that inhibits crime. Negative
publicity is a case in point. Multiple sources of negative publicity can
affect corporate (and manager) actions or outcomes, including:
environmental activism,30 mandatory firm disclosure,31 or formal charges.32
Generally, studies support the notion that bad environmental news affects a
firm’s reputation and market performance. However, the literature is mixed
as to when in the legal process reputational damage is most salient (notice
of pending charges, case announcement, processing, or case resolution);33
26

See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 8, at 133–40.
See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 22, at 556. In addition, managers with lower
ethical standards and managers ordered to do so are more likely to violate regulations. See
SIMPSON, supra note 21, at 41–42.
28
Natalie Marie Schell-Busey, The Deterrent Effects of Ethics Codes for Corporate
Crime: A Meta-Analysis 85 (2009) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland,
College Park) (on file with Digital Repository at the University of Maryland, College Park).
29
See Gray & Deily, supra note 20, at 100.
30
See Neil Gunningham et al., Social License and Environmental Protection: Why
Businesses Go Beyond Compliance, 29 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 307, 318, 322 (2004); Robert
A. Kagan et al., Explaining Corporate Environmental Performance: How Does Regulation
Matter?, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 51, 71–72 (2003).
31
See Shameek Konar & Mark A. Cohen, Information As Regulation: The Effect of
Community Right to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions, 32 J. ENVTL. ECON. & MGMT. 109, 110
(1997).
32
See Wallace N. Davidson III et al., Stock Market Reactions to Announced Corporate
Illegalities, 13 J. BUS. ETHICS 979, 985 (1994).
33
Id.
27
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whether stock prices are differentially responsive to civil, criminal, or
regulatory moving agents;34 or even if negative stock reactions are best
understood as “reputational” costs delivered by the market or costs
primarily imposed by the legal community.35
When reputational damages stem mainly from formal legal
proceedings, this can be seen as part of a deterrence strategy. However,
informal sanctions also impose stigmatic, commitment, and attachment
costs for managers who violate the law.36 These effects may be a direct
consequence of formal sanctions37 or completely unrelated to formal
proceedings. In a study of corporate offending intentions, Elis and Simpson
found inhibitory effects associated with the certainty of internally imposed
informal sanctions (shame) and externally imposed informal sanctions (loss
of respect from family, friends, and business associates).38 Importantly, the
threat of both individual and firm reputational damage had an inhibitory
effect. But these effects were independent of and tended to trump formal
sanction risks (which were relatively unimportant sources of deterrence).
Although the literature is slim and contradictory, there is evidence that
firm-level stigmatic consequences trickle down to responsible managers.39
In a study of all SEC and DOJ enforcement actions brought between
January 1978 and September 2006 against 788 firms in which financial
misrepresentation occurred, Karpoff, Lee, and Martin report that 93% of all
executives and 96% of other employees identified as legally responsible for
the behavior were fired “for reasons that are directly related to their
misconduct.”40 Job loss was more likely when misconduct was particularly
costly to shareholders and when offenders faced strong governance
34

See Bruce Mizrach & Susan Zhang Weerts, Does the Stock Market Punish Corporate
Malfeasance? A Case Study of Citigroup, 3 CORP. OWNERSHIP & CONTROL 151, 153–54
(2006) (serving as an example of how reputational consequences can flow from different
moving agents).
35
See Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Reputational Penalties for Environmental
Violations: Empirical Evidence, 48 J.L. & ECON. 653, 665–68 (2005).
36
See Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and
Severity of Punishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 JUST. Q. 173, 210 (1987)
(citing Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, Perceptual Research on General Detterence:
A Critical Review, 20 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 545, 568 (1986)).
37
See Kirk R. Williams & Richard Hawkins, The Meaning of Arrest for Wife Assault, 27
CRIMINOLOGY 163, 166 (1989).
38
See Elis & Simpson, supra note 24, at 410–11.
39
See Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate
Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 523 (1999); Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Cost to
Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 605–07 (2008).
40
Jonathan M. Karpoff et al., The Consequences to Managers for Financial
Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. ECON. 193, 204 (2008).
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structures.41 From this literature, we expect that command-and-control as
well as self-regulatory strategies will benefit from accounting for the
informal stigmatic costs to the individual.
B. RISK FACTORS FOR CORPORATE OFFENDING
There are many different empirically identified “risk factors” for
corporate crime. These factors are important in our study because effective
regulation should minimize the likelihood of criminal behavior in the face
of pressures and predilections. Below, we summarize some of the known
risk factors for corporate environmental crime with the caveat that many of
these same risk factors also are associated with offending by companies
more generally.
Looking first at firm characteristics, some research has found financial
strain (measured in different ways) to significantly increase the likelihood
that firms, plants, and managers will violate environmental laws and/or
increase pollution levels.42 In vignette studies specifically, after controlling
for individual-level predictors, managers are significantly more likely to
engage in price-fixing, bribery, fraud, or EPA violations if the act will give
the organization an edge over foreign competition or the act will result in
substantial savings for the firm.43 When firm profits are slowing or
declining, managers and employees may resort to criminal practices to
attain performance goals.44
In other studies, however, firm profit either is unrelated to
environmental (and occupational health and safety) violations45 or has a
positive effect on offending.46 Simpson, for example, finds that managers’
intentions to offend were higher when the firm was depicted as growing its
sales.47 Thus, offending may be related to both financial decline and

41

Id. at 194.
See CLINARD & YEAGER, supra note 4, at 128–29; Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A.
Cohen, New Evidence on the Origins of Corporate Crime, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION
ECON. 421, 421 (1996); Kagan et al., supra note 30, at 51–90; Marie McKendall et al.,
Corporate Governance and Corporate Illegality: The Effects of Board Structure on
Environmental Violations, 7 INT’L J. ORG. ANALYSIS 201, 203 (1999).
43
See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 22, at 557–59.
44
See generally Neal Shover & Kevin M. Bryant, Theoretical Explanations of Corporate
Crime, in UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE CRIMINALITY 141, 154 (Michael B. Blankenship ed.,
1993).
45
See Charles W. L. Hill et al., An Empirical Examination of the Causes of Corporate
Wrongdoing in the United States, 45 HUM. REL. 1055, 1070–71 (1992).
46
See Marie A. McKendall & John A. Wagner, III, Motive, Opportunity, Choice, and
Corporate Illegality, 8 ORG. SCI. 624, 625–26, 638 (1997).
47
See SIMPSON, supra note 21, at 126.
42
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growth. Corporate observers suggest that a lack of predictability may
underlie both of these situations, especially if the change is unexpected or
rapid in nature.48
The literature also predicts a link between intra-organizational
structures and offending. Within companies, decisions follow particular
lines of communication and responsibility. Managers have shown a
tendency to obey authority, even when ordered to behave unethically or
violate the law.49 This is true especially for middle-level managers who are
responsible for carrying out orders but who have relatively little
decisionmaking authority vis-à-vis top management.50
Although organizational characteristics are often associated with
corporate crime because they provide opportunity, context, or motivations
for offending, as mentioned previously, managers—not companies—make
decisions. Managerial decisions might be affected by individual norms 51
and differences in traits such as impulsivity, hubris, desire for control,
Machiavellianism, and self-serving bias.52 Although evidence on the link
between corporate crime and low self-control53 is weak at best,54 empirical
findings support an association between some of these other individual
traits and illegality and/or other negative business outcomes.55

48

MICHAEL E. PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY: TECHNIQUES FOR ANALYZING
INDUSTRIES AND COMPETITORS 324 (1980).
49
HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITY (1989).
50
See MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE ETHICS AND CRIME: THE ROLE OF MIDDLE
MANAGEMENT 21–23 (1983).
51
See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Beyond Elegance: A Testable Typology of Social Norms
in Corporate Environmental Compliance, 22 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 63–67 (2003).
52
See Paul Babiak et al., Corporate Psychopathy: Talking the Walk, 28 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
174, 190 (2010).
53
See MICHAEL R. GOTTFREDSON & TRAVIS HIRSCHI, A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME
180–201 (1990) (discussing white-collar crime); Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, The
Significance of White-Collar Crime for a General Theory of Crime, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 359,
360–62 (1989).
54
See WEISBURD ET AL., supra note 4, at 187–88; Michael L. Benson & Elizabeth
Moore, Are White-Collar and Common Offenders the Same?: An Empirical and Theoretical
Critique of a Recently Proposed General Theory of Crime, 29 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 251,
260–63 (1992); Sally S. Simpson & Nicole Leeper Piquero, Low Self-Control,
Organizational Theory, and Corporate Crime, 36 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 509, 531–33 (2002).
55
See Katherine A. DeCelles & Michael D. Pfarrer, Heroes or Villains? Corruption and
the Charismatic Leader, 11 J. LEADERSHIP & ORGANIZATIONAL STUD. 67, 69–70 (2004);
Matthew L. A. Hayward & Donald C. Hambrick, Explaining the Premiums Paid for Large
Acquisitions: Evidence of CEO Hubris, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 103, 106–10 (1997); Nicole
Leeper Piquero, M. Lyn Exum & Sally S. Simpson, Integrating the Desire-for-Control and
Rational Choice in a Corporate Crime Context, 22 JUST. Q. 252, 268–72 (2005).
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In sum, the body of evidence regarding the specific levers of corporate
crime control is limited and inconclusive. Importantly, little is known
about how effective different regulatory strategies or components are in the
context of known or suspected risk factors—both organizational and
individual. To address this issue, we rely on data drawn from a factorial
survey administered to two samples of corporate employees. The first
sample includes corporate managers recruited as part of a National Institute
of Justice (NIJ)-funded study on corporate environmental noncompliance.
The second sample includes employees of public and private companies,
drawn from a broader sample of the population. Both sets of participants
responded to web-based surveys that depicted two hypothetical scenarios
designed to assess individuals’ propensity to engage in significant pollution
violations (e.g., discharging toxins into waterways) and less serious
environmental offenses (e.g., ignoring an EPA compliance order).
III. METHODS
Factorial surveys combine experimentally manipulated hypothetical
scenarios (vignettes) with survey questions to measure respondents’
intentions, decisions, attitudes, or judgments.56 These designs, unlike more
traditional survey techniques, allow researchers to manipulate a full range
of circumstances that may affect a decision—essentially taking into account
“the complexity and richness in the way people approach decisions and
evaluations.”57 The design also avoids some of the temporal ordering and
perceptual instability problems associated with other research designs. 58
Vignette surveys can be less threatening methods of data collection than
self-report surveys when the subject matter is sensitive, such as when
respondents are queried about unethical, criminal, or deviant behavior.
Although vignettes have been used extensively in the social sciences59 and
56

See PETER HENRY ROSSI & STEVEN L. NOCK, MEASURING SOCIAL JUDGMENTS 9–13
(1982).
57
Edward D. Weber et al., The PC Vignette Generating Program (1988) (on file with the
University of Massachusetts Social and Demographic Research Institute, Amherst, MA).
58
See Linda Saltzman et al., Deterrent and Experiential Effects: The Problem of Causal
Order in Perceptual Deterrence Research, 19 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 172, 174 (1982).
59
In criminology, vignette studies were used to evaluate the appropriateness of corporate
crime punishments, see Joan L. Miller et al., Felony Punishments: A Factorial Survey of
Perceived Justice in Criminal Sentencing, 82 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 396, 396–415
(1991); public perceptions of white-collar crime seriousness, see James Frank et al.,
Sanctioning Corporate Crime: How Do Business Executives and the Public Compare?, 13
AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 139, 139–41 (1989); and offending intentions, see Steven Klepper &
Daniel Nagin, The Deterrent Effect of Perceived Certainty and Severity of Punishment
Revisited, 27 CRIMINOLOGY 721, 729 (1989); George Loewenstein et al., The Effect of
Sexual Arousal on Expectations of Sexual Forcefulness, 34 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 443,
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business to collect useful information about topics such as survey
participation60 and consumer preferences,61 they also have some drawbacks.
Critics have raised concerns about: the link between reported intentions and
actual behavior and whether the relationship is sensitive to the respondent’s
sex and the situation analyzed;62 the extent of social desirability bias in
responses, especially in the constant-variable value vignettes where all
respondents read identical scenarios;63 whether there are “order” effects;64
and whether scenario-based research is valid and reliable;65 among other
issues. Poorly considered dimensions and components of the scenarios
contribute to validity problems.
In this study, to increase data validity, we draw extensively from the
empirical and theoretical literatures to identify relevant attributes and levels
for the vignettes. We also asked environmental professionals and people in
business to review drafts of the vignettes and the instrument was revised
accordingly.66 We experimentally rotated vignette items within the
scenario dimensions to lessen social desirability bias. To minimize the
biasing effect of vignette order, we randomly allocated items to respondents
and asked them to imagine themselves in the position of the vignette
actor.67 Order effects are more likely when respondents have little
445 (1997); Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 22, at 558; N. Craig Smith et al., supra note
23, at 645.
60
See Robert M. Groves et al., A Laboratory Approach to Measuring the Effects on
Survey Participation of Interview Length, Incentives, Differential Incentives, and Refusal
Conversion, 15 J. OFFICIAL STAT. 251 (1999).
61
See Alice Grønhøj & Tino Bech-Larsen, Using Vignettes to Study Family
Consumption Processes, 27 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 445 (2010).
62
See Stefanie Eifler, Evaluating the Validity of Self-Reported Deviant Behavior Using
Vignette Analyses, 41 QUALITY & QUANTITY 303, 306–10 (2007); M. Lyn Exum et al, SelfReported Intentions to Offend: All Talk and No Action?, 37 AM. J. CRIM. JUST. 523, 534
(2011).
63
See generally Gerald. F. Cavanaugh & David J. Fritzsche, Using Vignettes in Business
Ethics Research, in 7 RESEARCH IN CORPORATE SOCIAL PERFORMANCE AND POLICY 279–93
(Lee E. Preston ed., 1985); Maria F. Fernandes & Donna M. Randall, The Nature of Social
Desirability Response Effects in Ethics Research, 2 BUS. ETHICS Q. 183 (1992).
64
See Katrin Auspurg & Annette Jäckle, First Equals Most Important?: Order Effects in
Vignette-Based Measurement 19–20 (Inst. for Soc. and Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
2012-01).
65
See Stefanie Eifler, Validity of a Factorial Survey Approach to the Analysis of
Criminal Behavior, 6 METHODOLOGY 139, 140 (2010); James Weber, Scenarios in Business
Ethics Research: Review, Critical Assessment, and Recommendations, 2 BUS. ETHICS Q.
137, 145–46 (1992).
66
See Kelly D. Wason et al., Designing Vignette Studies in Marketing, 10
AUSTRALASIAN MARKETING J. 41, 53 (2002).
67
See id. at 41–43.
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knowledge or care little about the topic.68 Our study explicitly sampled
environmental experts (discussed below), and we asked respondents to
report on their experiences with and attitudes about depicted behaviors as
part of the survey. Although the jury is still out, research also has shown a
reasonable correlation between reported intentions and behavior.69 Given
the sensitive subject matter (corporate offending) as well as our attention to
methodological concerns in the design of the instrument, we believe the
factorial survey method is a reasonable and valid approach to our research
question.
A. SCENARIO CONSTRUCTION
One of the first steps in factorial survey construction is to determine
the “domain” of the judgment or decision. The vignette domain consists of
dimensions believed to affect the manager’s decision to engage in corporate
offending. Guided by a modified rational choice theory70 and the corporate
crime empirical literature, a number of pushes and pulls toward crime at the
individual and corporate level are incorporated into the vignette design.
Scenarios are created from rotated elements or levels within dimensions.
To illustrate, the firm’s environmental constraints (one dimension) provide
contextual information to the respondent about the economic environment
in which the company is conducting its business. The type of constraint
(e.g., the industry is losing ground to foreign competitors, the industry is
economically healthy, the industry is economically deteriorating) is
randomly assigned to each scenario. Further, management level is an intraorganizational dimension empirically linked to offending decisions.
Pressures on middle managers to achieve corporate goals—often with the
implicit message “by any means necessary”71—and unrealistic performance
metrics72 create a greater likelihood of corporate crime by midlevel
managers compared with top management (who generally set company
goals and strategies for others to achieve). Research has also found that
managers adhere to authority structures within firms.73 The probability of
68

Auspurg & Jäckle, supra note 64, at 1.
See Greg Pogarsky, Projected Offending and Contemporaneous Rule-Violation:
Implications for Heterotypic Continuity, 42 CRIMINOLOGY 111, 115 (2004); Harry Telser &
Peter Zweifel, Validity of Discrete-Choice Experiments Evidence for Health Risk Reduction,
39 APPLIED ECON. 69, 72–75 (2007).
70
See Paternoster & Simpson, supra note 22, at 553–57.
71
CLINARD, supra note 50, at 22–23.
72
John Braithwaite, White-Collar Crime, Competition, and Capitalism: Comment on
Coleman, 94 AM. J. SOC. 627, 629 (1988).
73
Joseph Sanders & V. Lee Hamilton, Distributing Responsibility for Wrongdoing Inside
Corporate Hierarchies: Public Judgments in Three Societies, 21 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 815,
69
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corporate crime is higher for those managers affirmatively instructed to
break a given rule. Thus, we varied the “locus of control” in the scenarios
based on whether or not the employee was ordered by a superior to commit
the offense. Finally, the ethical tone and culture of a company can affect
how managers perceive corporate crime (as acceptable or not) which, in
turn, may increase or decrease the anticipated rewards/costs of offending.
Dimensions that rotate levels of managerial ethics, firm volunteerism, and
internal compliance systems also are randomized within the scenarios. The
specific dimensions of interest (and randomized levels within each) for this
Article are listed in Appendix I.
The survey instrument contains two “offending” vignettes. One
noncompliance scenario describes a technical violation (e.g., failure to
act/comply with an environmental agency’s order) with no indication of
whether it will affect pollution levels. The other depicts a more substantial
pollution event (the intentional release of a toxic substance into a local
waterway) that exceeds permitted levels by 200%. Sample scenarios can be
found in Appendix II. The vignettes are followed by a series of questions
that relate to a specific scenario, general questions that measure
respondents’ opinions and beliefs, and requests for demographic/work
information about the respondent and his/her current employer.
B. SURVEY ADMINISTRATION
As noted previously, the factorial survey was first pretested,
redesigned, and then vetted with environmental scholars, regulators, and
executives. The instrument was modified to address any remaining
concerns and adopted to be administered using a web-based Internet site.
Data collection occurred in two waves. The survey first was administered
in companies that were part of a larger NIJ-funded grant.74 The original
research assessed patterns of environmental offending and company
responses to governmental interventions (regulatory, civil, or criminal). An
additional goal was to look inside the black box of the corporation by
studying managers’ perceptions of corporate environmental crime and learn
about their decisionmaking processes. All firms (whether participants in
the vignette survey or not) were drawn from a sample of U.S.-owned
companies in three basic manufacturing industries (steel, pulp and paper,
and oil refining). These firms owned manufacturing sites that were
designated by the EPA as “major” facilities.75 Of the forty-eight firms
853 (1997).
74
See SIMPSON ET AL., supra note 19.
75
Whether a facility is deemed “major” or not is determined by the facility’s volume and
type of wastewater, as well as its potential for discharging toxic wastes. See Peter C.
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contacted to participate in this study, only three companies agreed to send
the survey out to their employees. Due to technical difficulties associated
with survey administration, one firm asked to withdraw from the project
after data had been collected. Thus, respondents for the study are
concentrated in two participating companies—one in the steel industry and
the other in pulp and paper.
The low rate of participation raises concerns of bias in the data. For
example, if ethical firms were more likely to participate, our results may
underestimate the likelihood of offending and the relationship between it
and key independent variables. To assess potential bias, we compared each
participating company’s average size (number of facilities owned, number
of employees), market value (total stockholders’ equity), compliance (total
violations, violation rate per number of facilities), and enforcement record
(total sanctions, total inspections, inspection rate per number of facilities) to
the seventy-one nonparticipants.76 The values for each company were taken
by averaging six years of data (1995–2000). We do not provide
significance tests due to the small sample size for participants (N = 2). One
participating company is much larger and has a higher market value than
the average company in the sample. It also has a better record of
compliance, including a lower violation rate (.43 standard deviations below
the mean for nonparticipating companies). The second participant is also
somewhat larger than the average company, but has a record of compliance
very similar to that of nonparticipating companies (.01 standard deviations
below the mean for nonparticipating companies).
Such firm-level
variability gives us confidence that responding managers come from
corporate environments with different environmental records—one better
than and one comparable to the “typical” nonparticipating firm in the NIJ
sample.
Fifty-four respondents from one company and sixteen participants
from another reported on their willingness to engage in the noncompliant
behaviors described in both scenario types, producing 140 scenarios. An
additional fourteen participants reported their behavioral intentions for one
scenario. This produced 154 cases for potential analysis. After listwise
deletion of independent variables, 126 cases from seventy respondents were
included in the final analysis.77
Yeager, Industrial Water Pollution, 18 CRIME & JUST. 97, 122 n.37 (1993).
76
See infra Appendix III, Table 1.
77
For both samples, only seventeen people who received both scenarios failed to
respond to both (fourteen in the NIJ sample; three in the TMone sample). Because eleven of
these are missing additional data, these respondents ultimately are excluded from further
analysis. Not surprisingly, after dropping those who completed only one scenario from the
analysis and comparing the results with the full sample, there are no significant observed
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Recognizing that respondents in the NIJ study were drawn from a
limited sample of large manufacturers, our goal in the second study was to
target a broader set of business managers and gain a larger pool of
respondents than in the first study.78 We also preferred potential
respondents to have some knowledge about environmental statutes and
compliance requirements. Accordingly we obtained a list of 7,292
environmental decisionmakers within a wide variety of organizations in the
United States from TMone, a company that provides targeted databases for
direct mail campaigns. The sampling frame list contained the individual’s
name as well as information about the entity for which he worked,
including the organization’s name, address, telephone number, and
webpage (if applicable).
From December 2008 to March 2009, Vanderbilt University sent
letters to potential respondents on the list indicating their selection for
survey participation. The letters also provided a link to the web-based
factorial survey. Of the 7,292 sent, 1,373 letters were returned as
undeliverable, leaving us with a potential sample pool of 5,919. To
increase response rates, Vanderbilt researchers sent out follow-up postcards
about three weeks after the initial letter was sent (from January 2009 to
April 2009). Seven hundred seventeen individuals logged into the survey
site, for a response rate of about 12%.79 This response rate is not atypical of
that seen in previous studies on web-based surveys.80 Low response rates
differences.
78
There were a few minor changes between the two survey instruments. When
applicable, differences between items are noted in the text.
79
We received about thirty contacts from individuals about the surveys, including
reasons for participating or not participating in the survey. Most of the contacts who
indicated they would not be responding to the survey mentioned a lack of technical
proficiency or not owning a computer. Many who reported not owning a computer were
also retired. Some mentioned that they simply were not interested or that they did not feel
like they were appropriate respondents because of their current jobs or work experiences
(e.g., did not see themselves as environmental experts). We provided technical assistance to
individuals who wanted to respond to the survey but had trouble accessing the website, and
encouraged those who felt they were inappropriately contacted to respond with the
understanding that we would consider their job description and experience when interpreting
results.
80
See generally Stephen R. Porter & Michael E. Whitcomb, The Impact of Contact Type
on Web Survey Response Rates, 67 PUB. OPINION Q. 579, 583–84 (2003) (comparing
different types of contacts and showing that response rates are relatively low regardless of
delivery condition); Ashok Ranchhod & Fan Zhou, Comparing Respondents of E-mail and
Mail Surveys: Understanding the Implications of Technology, 19 MARKETING INTELLIGENCE
& PLANNING 254 (2001). Scholars have long noted that web-based surveys have certain
features that reduce the likelihood of response. For instance, researchers cannot include
tangible incentives that can increase participation (e.g., pens, stickers), the formatting of web
surveys may make the questionnaire appear longer and less professional, respondents may
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do not necessarily equate to nonresponse bias. If respondent characteristics
are similar to nonrespondent characteristics, then the survey responses can
reasonably be attributed to the larger target sample.81
To assess
nonresponse bias, we took a random sample of 500 individuals from the
5,919 who received the invitation to participate. For each of these 500
people, we gathered additional information regarding the type of
organization (publicly or privately owned corporation, government agency,
NGO or civic association, law firm, private consulting firm, or other) and
the type of profession (environmentally related or not), the size of the
entity, and the gender of the individual. As shown in Appendix III (Table
2), we compared respondents to nonrespondents on these four dimensions,
and found that the only significant difference between the two groups was
organization size. Respondents came from slightly larger organizations
(mean = 14.04 employees) than nonparticipants (mean = 9.59 employees).82
However, the similarities on the other dimensions suggest nonresponse may
not be a major problem. Even so, we are cautious with our interpretation
and extrapolation of findings.
C. RESPONDENT INFORMATION
Merging the two sets of respondents yields a total of 237 scenarios
from 161 individuals.83

feel that data integrity is not secure, and technical issues may affect responsivity. See id. at
254–56; Linda J. Sax et al., Assessing Response Rates and Nonresponse Bias in Web and
Paper Surveys, 44 RES. HIGHER EDUC. 409 (2003).
81
Sax et al., supra note 80, at 409–32.
82
The range on this variable is 1 to 370 employees. Although statistically significant,
we question whether this is a meaningful difference. Both means are on the small side and if
we round 9.59 up to 10, both responders and nonparticipants fall within the same business
size classification according to the U.S. Census. Statistics About Business Size, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (Aug. 22, 2012), http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html.
83
For comparison purposes, the demographic characteristics of each sample are shown
in Table 1, infra. As these descriptions demonstrate, our strategy to get a broader range of
respondents in the TMone sample was successful.
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Table 1
Demographics and Perceptions of Company
Environmental Strategies, by Sample
Marital Status
Gender
Age
Education
HS degree or
equivalent
Some college
4-year college degree
Some graduate study

NIJ Sample
(N = 70)
94% married
93% male
Mean = 45.99

TMone Sample
(N = 91)
80% married
79% male
Mean = 54.47

Total Sample
(N = 161)
85% married
84% male
Mean = 50.49

2.74%

57.29%

35.56%

5.48%
57.53%
13.70%

30.21%
5.21%
1.04%

20.00%
26.67%
6.11%

Graduate degree
20.55%
6.25%
Involvement with environmental decisionmaking
Not involved
4.29%
4.17%
Somewhat involved
28.57%
10.42%
Routinely involved
67.14%
85.42%
Management experience
Years working for
Mean = 18.78
Mean = 13.87
current employer
Years of business
Mean = 23.34
Mean = 30.84
experience
Managerial position84
Lower: 17.14%
Employee: 5.15%
Middle: 75.71%
Management: 17.53%
Upper: 7.14%
Executive: 77.32%
Environmental commitment of respondent’s firm
Excessive
10.00%
9.28%
About right
88.57%
88.66%
Could use work
1.43%
2.06%
Poor
0.00%
0.00%
Compliance systems in respondent’s company
Code of ethics
100%
63%
Mandatory ethics
91%
20%
training
Random audits
26%
4%
Anonymous hotline
99%
10%
Corporate environ.
99%
38%
mgmt. system or
company policy85
Top mgmt. treats ethics
91%
60%
and violations seriously

11.67%
4.38%
18.13%
77.50%
Mean = 16.12
Mean = 27.39
--

9.54%
88.60%
1.86%
0.00%
80%
51%
14%
49%
-65%

84
The two samples received different response choices to the question, “What is your
management level?”
85
The two samples received different questions about company policy. The NIJ sample
was asked, “Does your current employer have [a] Corporate Environmental Management
System?” The TMone sample was asked whether their company had a “[c]ompany policy
regarding environmental compliance management systems in relevant business sites.”
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As reported in Table 1, the average respondent is about fifty years of
age. Most are married (85%) and male (84%), and a substantial majority
attended college or graduate school (64%). They are experienced and loyal
workers, with an average career length of twenty-seven years, sixteen of
which have been with their current employer. About 78% report being
routinely involved with environmental decisionmaking in their respective
companies. Most respondents have a positive assessment of their firms’
ethical commitments. Sixty-five percent of the respondents report that top
management treats ethics and violations seriously, and 89% report that the
environmental commitment of their firm is just right. There is more
variation in the kinds of ethics training and compliance systems utilized by
their firms. About 80% of respondents report the presence of a code of
ethics in their workplace, 51% report mandatory ethics training, 14% report
random audits, and 49% report an anonymous hotline.86
D. MEASURES
1. Dependent Variable
After reading each scenario, respondents were asked to rate how likely
they were to act like the manager in the scenario (0 = no chance at all to 10
= 100% chance), who in both scenarios always engages in noncompliant
behavior. Therefore the dependent variable measures the respondent’s
willingness or intention to act illegally. Intentions are not distributed
equally across vignette types; individuals were much less likely to offend
when given the “significant noncompliance” scenario than when they were
given the “technical noncompliance” scenario. Specifically, in the 113
EPA-order-defiance scenarios, 57.5% (N = 65) of the respondents reported
no chance of offending. In comparison, 102 out of the 124 (82.3%) of the
respondents to the toxic-release scenario reported no chance of offending.
86

This seems fairly typical for major corporations. A recent LRN ethics study, for
instance, found eight out of ten employees reporting that their organization has a written
code of conduct or ethics. Moreover, a large percent (83%) also say that their management
“genuinely” wants to promote integrity and ethics in the organization. LRN CORP., THE
IMPACT OF CODES OF CONDUCT ON CORPORATE CULTURE 3 (2006), available at
http://www.ethics.org/files/u5/LRNImpactofCodesofConduct.pdf. The code of ethics or
code of conduct is the most common part of the compliance infrastructure and hotlines are
also fairly common. Highly regulated industries tend to have more detailed compliance
structures.
DONNA BOEHME, FROM ENRON TO MADOFF: WHY MOST CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE AND ETHICS PROGRAMS ARE POSITIONED FOR FAILURE 28 (2009), available at
http://compliancestrategists.net/sitebuildercontent/sitebuilderfiles/Rand1.pdf. We expected
and found the NIJ respondents (steel; pulp and paper) to report more extensive systems than
the TMone sample.
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Combined, 167 out of the 237 (70.5%) scenarios in the total survey had a
“no chance of offending” outcome reported. 87 Given the obvious positive
skew on offending overall as well as by scenario type, we recoded the
dependent variable to a binary outcome (0 = unwilling to act like the
manager in the scenario; 1 = 10% or more chance of acting like the
manager in the scenario and engaging in illegal behavior).88
2. Independent Variables
The independent variables can be sorted into three main categories:
relevant control variables, individual/corporate risk factors for offending,
and variables that capture some aspect of regulation (command-and-control,
firm self-regulation). Variables are drawn from the vignettes themselves,89
questions that follow each survey, and demographic information reported
by respondents. Each class of variables is described briefly below.
i.

Controls

Although there are a number of potential control variables to include
in this analysis, we focused primarily on variables that had a significant
bivariate relationship with the dependent variable90 or affected offending
intentions in preliminary analyses, once other variables were included in the
models. Questions ask respondents to assess scenario realism (0 = not
realistic, 1 = realistic) and to rate the desirability of the behavior (0 = not at
all desirable to 10 = very desirable) and how likely the manager’s actions
were to endanger human life and wildlife (0 = no chance at all to 10 =
100% chance). We also included measures that controlled for: (1) the
respondent’s years of business experience; (2) whether the respondent had
personally experienced or knew about any of the offense types presented;91
87
Only people with no missing data are included in our analysis. Consequently, we do
not lose any cases across models.
88
Alternative coding strategies for the dependent variable (0–10) and analyses (OLS and
Tobit) were conducted to assess whether the binary coding scheme is defensible. Results are
substantively the same as those reported with only minor observed differences (results
available on request). Because our primary interest in this study is to determine whether
certain interventions minimize the likelihood of offending, it made sense for us to truncate
all positive responses into a binary 0/1 coding scheme.
89
Vignette characteristics entered into the models are dummy variables scored as 1 if the
characteristic was present in the scenario and 0 if it was not included. The choice of the
reference category is determined by theory and ease of interpretation.
90
See infra Table 2.
91
The two samples received slightly different versions of this question—the NIJ sample
was asked whether they had personal experience with or knew about any of the scenarios
presented in the same question while the TMone sample was only asked about personal
experience with each scenario. Further, we could not distinguish which of the specific
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(3) scenario type (technical noncompliance versus release of toxins); and
(4) whether the respondent was part of the NIJ sample (coded as 1) or the
TMone sample (coded as 0).
ii. Risk Factors
Individual-level factors
The corporate crime literature has identified several individual-level
characteristics that might confound the relationship between preventionand-control strategies and offending intentions. Our respondents were
asked several questions that tap into some of these attributes. Personal selfinterest was measured by two questions about perceived career benefits
from the crime (crude measures of Machiavellianism) and the level of
excitement associated with illegal behavior (respondents rated both on 11point scales where higher scores indicated greater perceived benefits).92
We expect that respondents who perceive more career benefits and greater
thrills will report higher offending intentions. The risk of crime also should
be greater when managers do not believe in the common value system
represented by the law. Social control theory, for instance, asserts “there is
variation in the extent to which people believe they should obey the rules of
society . . . . [T]he less a person believes he should obey the rules, the more
likely he is to violate them.”93 To examine this, we asked respondents their
degree of agreement with the following statement: “Individuals should
comply with the law so long as it does not go against what s/he thinks is
right.” Agreement with such a statement suggests that the respondent does
not share conventional attitudes about the moral authority of law and is
therefore at greater risk for offending.
Company-level factors
Risks associated with the company are captured in two types of
measures: economic constraints on the firm and managerial position and
authority. In the vignettes, respondents assessed scenario conditions

vignettes the NIJ sample had personal experience with or knew about. Thus, for both
samples, this variable reflects personal experience or knowledge about any of the
environmental situations presented, including overcompliance scenarios (not discussed in
this paper). Although the NIJ sample is more likely to report having personal
experience/hearing about these behaviors (mean = 0.896) than the TMone sample (mean =
0.577), this result may be due to the more inclusive nature of the NIJ question than a true
difference in personal experience.
92
The distribution of the “perceived thrills” variable is skewed to the right, with 197 out
of 237 responses at 0 (out of a possible 10). The mean of this variable is 0.43. We
examined all six models using a dichotomous version of the variable, but results were
substantively the same. We therefore report the results using the full 10-point scale.
93
TRAVIS HIRSCHI, CAUSES OF DELINQUENCY 26 (1969).
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wherein the firm was depicted as economically deteriorating, economically
healthy, or losing ground to foreign competition. In addition, research has
shown that a manager’s location within the company affects offending risk
as pressures are often placed on middle managers to meet performance
goals regardless of whether these goals can be achieved within the
constraints of the law. Similarly, offending risks are also tied to whether
managers are in a position to compel others to act illegally. So manager
level (middle and upper) and decisionmaking authority (asked by
supervisor to act versus made an independent decision) are included as
company risk factors; both variables are drawn from the hypothetical
scenarios.
iii. Regulation
Firm Self-Regulation
Several vignette dimensions are important indicators of company selfregulation. For example, scenarios contained information about whether
the depicted company participated (or not) in voluntary EPA pollutionreduction programs; the kind of internal compliance system at the firm (a
range from mandatory training through mandatory self-reporting of
releases); whether ethics typically guide decisionmaking in the firm; and
the consequences for managers who were discovered by the company to be
behaving in similar activities (graduated consequences from no
consequence at all to the employee was fired).
Informal Sanction Risk
We also created a standardized scale that takes into account the
perceived certainty and severity of three business-related informal sanctions
directed at the individual. Variables include the perceived likelihood and
cost of losing the respect of business associates, loss of job, and future harm
to job prospects if the behavior was discovered informally. This scale also
incorporates a measure of respondents’ perceptions regarding the likelihood
that their actions would be discovered by the firm but not by legal
authorities.94
Command and Control
After each scenario, respondents were asked to evaluate the adequacy
94

Prior to standardization, scores can range from 0 to 3000. After centering, the range is
from 1.889 to 1.699. Preliminary analysis revealed a significant difference between
samples. TMone respondents perceive lower risks (mean = 1321.113) than do NIJ
respondents (mean = 1812.02). However, the biserial correlations between the informal
sanctions scale and the outcome are similar for the two samples. The biserial correlation
between informal business sanctions and offending decisions are NIJ rpb = -0.38, p < .01;
TMone rpb = -0.36, p < 0.01; merged sample rpb = - 0.39, p < .01. There is no evidence of
outliers affecting this relationship.

254

SALLY S. SIMPSON, ET AL.

[Vol. 103

(0 = too strict to 10 = too lenient) of the laws governing the behavior
described in the scenario.95 In addition, five questions focused on the
respondents’ perceptions of the formal costs of offending for the individual
actor. The responses to these five questions were combined to form a
formal sanction scale.96 The scale takes into account both respondents’
perceptions of the likelihood that a given negative outcome (e.g., being
arrested, sued, or investigated by a regulatory agency) will result from the
manager’s actions (i.e., certainty) and how much of a problem the negative
outcome would cause for the respondent (i.e., severity). Certainty (0 = no
chance at all to 10 = 100% chance) and severity (0 = no problem at all to 10
= a very big problem) were measured on an 11-point scale.97
IV. ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Table 2 reports on bivariate relationships between reported offending
intentions and the key independent regulatory variables of interest.

95

Contradictory findings may emerge from this variable. Consistent with deterrence, the
risk of offending should be low if law is perceived to be punitive. However, procedural
justice and defiance theory would predict greater offending risk if law is perceived to be
“overly strict,” since this may tap into perceptions that law is unfair and illegitimate. See
TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1993); Lawrence W. Sherman, Defiance,
Deterrence, and Irrelevance: A Theory of the Criminal Sanction, 30 J. RES. CRIME &
DELINQ. 445 (1993).
96
The construction of these scales is discussed in more detail (as are other variables) in
Appendix IV.
97
This excludes regulatory investigation, which only has direct implications for the firm.
We calculated the scale in the following manner: Individual Formal Sanction Risk =
(Certainty of criminal * Severity of criminal) + (Certainty of civil * Severity of civil).
Certainty = the certainty of outcomes [arrest (criminal); being personally sued (civil)]; and
Severity = the perceived severity of those outcomes.
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Several of the relationships were significant and in the predicted
direction. For instance, informal sanctions were negatively related to
managerial intentions (offending propensity, rpb = -.386, p < .01).
Managers who perceived substantial discovery costs were less apt to violate
the law. Similarly, intentions were inhibited when managers were depicted
as being reprimanded within the company for engaging in similar acts (Ф =
-.137, p < .05) and when formal sanctions were perceived as likely (rpb =
-.280, p < .001). Conversely, reported offending was more likely when
companies had mandatory ethics training as part of an internal compliance
system (Ф = .134, p < .05). As respondents’ assessments of environmental
law moved toward overly harsh or punitive, crime propensity increased
slightly (rpb = -.124, p < .10), suggesting a potential defiance effect.
Our bivariate correlations also revealed significant relationships
between risk factors, especially those measured at the individual level, and
offending propensity. Illegal intentions increased when the act was thought
to be thrilling (rpb = .290, p < .001) or likely to bring career benefits
(rpb = .352, p < .001).
Consistent with our social-control argument,
offending appears more likely when belief in the moral authority of the law
is variable (rpb = .163, p < .01). Most situational risk factors that capture
firm-level processes (e.g., management level, economic constraints, and
foreign competition) were not significantly correlated with offending with
the exception of our measure of authority structure. Reported offending is
more likely under the condition of a supervisor’s request (i.e., asked by
one’s supervisor to act illegally, Ф = .142, p < .05).
As previously noted, our dependent variable is a dichotomous outcome
so logistic regression is used to assess variable relationships. To enhance
statistical power, the two scenarios are combined and analyzed together.98
Therefore, the majority of people contribute two responses to each set of
analyses and the observations are not independent of one another, which is
a key assumption of multivariate regression. When this assumption is
violated, coefficient estimates will be consistent (i.e., unbiased), but
standard errors are no longer valid.99 For this reason, we estimate robust
standard errors using the Huber/White/sandwich estimator to take into
account the lack of independence among observations.100
98
We considered whether combining the outcomes made sense analytically as well as
statistically. Logically, it seems reasonable to couple the illegal behaviors since both violate
legal requirements or standards, albeit by different degrees. We statistically control for
offense type in our models.
99
SOPHIA RABE-HESKETH & ANDERS SKRONDAL, MULTILEVEL AND LONGITUDINAL
MODELING USING STATA 34 (2005).
100
An alternative method for handling lack of independence between observations is to
estimate a random effects model, which allows the intercept to vary across individuals.
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Our logistic regression analysis proceeds in stages.101 In the first
stage, we examine the effect of firm and individual risk factors on
offending intentions (including control variables). In the next model, we
add the effects of informal sanctions. We know from the social control and
deterrence literatures that informal sanctions may operate independently to
inhibit offending, but informal sanctions may also be triggered as a
consequence of internal compliance structures or by command-and-control
interventions. Therefore, it is important first to examine informal sanctions
separately from other regulatory elements. Our third model includes
company self-regulation variables without informal sanctions. This enables
us both to assess whether elements of this control strategy affect
willingness to violate and to examine if the effects of the risk factors are
mitigated by the addition of these variables. Our fourth model combines
company self-regulation and informal sanctions.
The fifth model
substitutes the command-and-control measures for the self-regulation and
informal sanctions variables. Finally, we estimate a full model including
both firm self-regulation and command-and-control measures to assess how
these strategies operate simultaneously.102 For the sake of brevity, we have

While estimating robust standard errors treats the correlation among time-varying variables
as a nuisance, random effects models explicitly model the lack of dependence and
decompose the total residual into between- and within-individual components. Id. at 74.
Given that our research question does not require us to estimate the size of the between- and
within-person error terms, we chose to use the simpler statistical method that requires the
estimation of fewer parameters.
101
To assess whether we could combine data from the two samples, we selected
variables that were significant in the regression models for the merged sample and
conducted separate analyses by sample source. As shown in Appendix V, there are notable
differences between samples. For instance, offending intentions are decreased for TMone
respondents for the major pollution event (compared with defying an EPA order) and when
informal sanction threats are high. Intentions increase when the act is perceived as thrilling.
Among NIJ respondents, intentions are lessened when managers perceive the risk of formal
sanctions to be high and consequential but increased when the depicted behavior is viewed
as desirable and beneficial to the respondent’s career. Although different variables are
significant for the two samples, the signs for the coefficients are similar across samples and
results are consistent with extant literature. Therefore, we have decided to merge the
samples to enhance statistical power. Future research would benefit from exploring how risk
and protective factors as well as the success of prevention-and-control strategies may vary
by company or industry characteristics. That particular question is beyond the scope of this
research.
102
We conduct a total of 145 hypothesis tests (including controls). Given this large
number of tests, we would expect seven significant results to occur by chance alone. Our
results, however, reveal forty-nine significant relationships (including controls)—
substantially more than would be expected by chance. Moreover, these findings are
consistent with extant empirical and theoretical expectations.
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removed the control variables from the Tables and report those results in
Appendix VI.103
Table 3
Regression of Behavioral Intentions on Risk Factors, Regulatory
Components, and Relevant Control Variables+ (N = 237)

Constant
Situational Risk
Asked
Midlevel manager
Economically
deteriorating
Foreign competition

Model 1:
Risk Factors

Model 2:
Informal Sanctions

Model 3:
Self-Regulation

B (Robust SE)

B (Robust SE)

B (Robust SE)

Odds ratio

Odds ratio

Odds ratio

1.21 (.92)

0.23 (1.00)

2.67 (1.34)**

.51 (.33)
1.66
-.12 (.35)
0.89
-.40 (.47)
0.67
-.51 (.39)
0.60

.53 (.38)
1.70
-.05 (.37)
0.95
-.41 (.50)
0.67
-.48 (.41)
0.62

.46 (.34)
1.58
-.11 (.35)
0.90
-.37 (.47)
0.69
-.57 (.43)
0.57

.23 (.07)***
1.26
.43 (.15)***
1.53
.05 (.06)
1.05

.18 (.08)**
1.20
.49 (.14)***
1.64
.04 (.07)
1.04

.24 (.08)***
1.27
.46 (.14)***
1.58
.05 (.06)
1.05

Individual Risk
Advance careera
Thrill
Conditional compliance
Self-regulation
Voluntary reduction
Ethics guide
management
Ethics are distinct

103

-.23 (.39)
0.79
-.51 (.49)
0.60
-.13 (.47)
0.88

Several of our control variables are significantly associated with willingness to
violate environmental regulations. Individuals are less willing to violate regulations when
the noncompliance is of a more significant nature (i.e., releasing toxins vs. ignoring a
compliance order) and when they perceive that there is a greater likelihood that the behavior
will endanger human life or wildlife. They are more willing to violate when they view the
behavior as more desirable. In addition, individuals who report more business experience
are marginally less willing to violate environmental law. It is important to note, however,
that several control variables have no effect in the model. Scenario realism does not affect
offending intentions, nor does sample origin (NIJ) or personal experience/knowledge of acts
depicted in scenarios. This latter null finding, which is consistent across all of our models, is
surprising considering the argument that “decisions from experience and decisions from
description can lead to dramatically different choice behavior.” Ralph Hertwig et al.,
Decisions from Experience and the Effect of Rare Events in Risky Choice, 15 PSYCHOL. SCI.
534, 534 (2004).
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-.47 (.62)
0.63
-.33 (.61)
0.72
.15 (.53)
1.16
-.05 (.65)
0.95
-.54 (.45)
0.58
-.70 (.51)
0.50

Self-reporting
Ethics training
Hotline
Fired
Reprimand
-.96 (.25)***
0.38

Informal sanctionsa
Command and Control
Formal sanctions
Adequacy of laws
Interactions
Career* informal
sanctionsa
Pseudo r2

.27

.33

.29

Continued
Model 4:

Model 5:
Command
and Control

Model 6:
Full Model

Model 7:
Interactions

B (Robust SE)

B (Robust SE)

B (Robust SE)

B (Robust SE)

Odds ratio

Odds ratio

Odds ratio

Odds ratio

1.19 (1.41)

.37 (1.10)

1.33 (1.54)

1.50 (1.58)

.47 (.39)
1.61
-.03 (.38)
0.97
-.37 (.52)
0.69
-.48 (.45)
0.62

.67 (.35)*
1.95
-.06 (.38)
0.94
-.25 (.49)
0.78
-.43 (.40)
0.65

.61 (.41)
1.83
-.04 (.40)
0.96
-.22 (.52)
0.81
-.43 (.45)
0.65

.62 (.41)
1.86
-.06 (.39)
0.94
-.16 (.52)
0.85
-.36 (.45)
0.70

.19 (.08)**
1.21
.51 (.13)***
1.67
.04 (.06)
1.04

.24 (.07)***
1.27
.53 (.17)***
1.70
.04 (.06)
1.04

.20 (.08)**
1.22
.57 (.15)***
1.76
.03 (.07)
1.03

.26 (.08)***
1.30
.54 (.15)***
1.72
.03 (.07)
1.03

-.11 (.45)
0.90
-.39 (.51)
0.68

0.01 (.45)
1.01
-.37 (.52)
0.69

SelfRegulation and
Informal

Constant
Situational Risk
Asked
Midlevel manager
Economically
deteriorating
Foreign competition
Individual Risk
Advance careera
Thrill
Conditional compliance
Self-regulation
Voluntary reduction
Ethics guide
management

-.03 (.42)
0.97
-.43 (.49)
0.65

2013]
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Random audits
Self-reporting
Ethics training
Hotline
Fired
Reprimand
Informal sanctionsa
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-.22 (.49)
0.80
-.24 (.64)
0.78
-.02 (.62)
0.98
.21 (.56)
1.23
.00 (.71)
1.00
-.41 (.48)
0.66
-.60 (.52)
0.55
-.91 (.26)***
0.40
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-.16 (.53)
0.85
-.34 (.65)
0.71
-.32 (.63)
0.73
.13 (.60)
1.13
-.11 (.72)
0.89
-.50 (.51)
0.61
-.66 (.54)
0.52
-.72 (.27)***
0.49

-.20 (.54)
0.82
-.42 (.64)
0.66
-.35 (.63)
0.71
-.35 (.63)
1.09
-.03 (.72)
0.97
-.40 (.50)
0.67
-.59 (.54)
0.55
-.98 (.32)***
0.37

-.56 (.27)**
0.57
-.07 (.11)
0.94

-.63 (.28)**
0.53
-.05 (.12)
0.95

.36

-.12 (.06)*
1.13
.37

Command and
Control
-.77 (.23)***
0.46
-.04 (.11)
0.96

Formal sanctions
Adequacy of laws
Interactions
Career* informal
sanctionsa
Pseudo r2

.35

.31

Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
Note: + Control variables are removed from the tables and reported in Appendix VI.
a
In model 7, “career” and “informal sanctions” were mean centered to ease interpretability of
coefficients.

Our main findings are reported in Table 3. As shown in model 1, the
decision to violate is related to instrumental considerations. Specifically,
individuals are more willing to violate when they believe this behavior will
advance their careers and when they perceive such behavior to be more
thrilling. For each unit increase in the respondent’s estimate that the
behavior will advance the manager’s career, the odds that the respondent
would be willing to violate environmental regulations increase by almost
26%. For every unit increase in perceived thrills, the odds of being willing
to offend increased by about 53%. None of the firm-level risk factors
examined are significantly related to willingness to violate.
In the second model, we add the informal sanctions scale. Informal
sanctions exert a strong inhibiting effect on offending; individuals who
perceive the informal costs associated with violating environmental law to
be more certain and severe are significantly less willing to violate. For
every unit increase in perceived business-related informal costs, the odds of
being willing to offend decrease by 62%. It is also noteworthy that the
effect of perceived danger to life becomes nonsignificant when informal
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sanctions are included in the model.104 The two variables are modestly
correlated (r = .315); thus, it appears our respondents believe informal costs
are higher for acts they perceive as more dangerous.
Model 3 includes our variables capturing elements of company selfregulation. None of the self-regulation variables significantly affect
offending intentions, nor do they mitigate the effect of the individual- and
firm-level risk factors. Directionally, however, most of the variables
operate in a predictable manner (except for mandatory ethics training and
an anonymous hotline). Notice that the inhibitory effect of danger to life on
offending intentions becomes significant once again in this model.105
Next, we examine the effect of including firm self-regulation variables
and perceived informal sanctions (model 4). The results are substantively
the same as the previous two models, with the firm self-regulation variables
remaining nonsignificant while informal sanctions exert a strongly
significant influence (odds of being willing to offend decrease 60% for
every unit increase in perceived informal costs). The previously significant
risk and control variables remain so in model 4 with the exception of
perceived danger, which again is rendered nonsignificant by the inclusion
of informal sanctions.106
In model 5, we examine variables capturing command-and-control
regulatory techniques, controlling for individual- and firm-level risk factors.
Individuals who believe that they will face more certain and severe formal
sanctions are significantly less willing to violate environmental
regulations.107 A one-unit increase in the formal sanctions costs scale
decreases the probability that the respondent is willing to violate
environmental regulations by about 54%. In contrast, the perceived
adequacy of the law governing the violating behavior is unrelated to
willingness to violate the law. Several of the individual- and firm-level risk
factors remain significant in this model. For instance, neither career
advancement nor thrill of the act is mitigated by formal sanction risk in this
model. However, this is the first model in which being asked to offend by
104

See infra Appendix VI.
See infra Appendix VI.
106
See infra Appendix VI.
107
We also examined the effects of formal sanctions directed at the firm (criminal, civil,
and regulatory sanction certainty and severity), but found that they were highly collinear
with the individual-level formal sanctions variable. When both scales were included in the
model, neither achieved statistical significance. When entering the variables separately,
individual-level sanctions exhibited a stronger and more consistent effect on offending
(reflecting the notion that managers may be more concerned with formal sanctions directed
at themselves) than did firm-level formal sanctions. Therefore, the decision was made to
drop firm-level sanctions from the analysis.
105
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one’s supervisor increases the propensity likelihood. Although the odds of
offending are 95% higher for those who have been asked to offend by a
superior versus those who have not, the effect is only marginally significant
(p < .10). Regarding the control variables (Appendix VI), the crimereduction effect associated with the perceived danger of the act (whether
the respondent believes that the behavior will endanger human life or
wildlife) is not significant here, a result we saw in the informal sanctions
models as well. The measure of formal sanctions is correlated with
perceived danger (r = 0.493), implying that formal sanctions (like informal
sanctions) may be redundant with perceptions of danger. The effects of
other controls in the model remain consistent.
In the full model depicted in Table 3 (model 6),108 company selfregulation and command-and-control variables are included along with the
risk and control variables. The influence of formal sanction costs and
informal costs are both somewhat reduced, but remain significant at p < .05.
Thus, for every unit increase in sanction risk, the odds of being willing to
offend decrease by 43% for formal sanctions and 51% for informal
sanctions. This outcome may be the consequence of the high correlation
between formal and informal costs (r = .498, see Table 2), but it is
informative that both types of sanctions continue to have an effect when
modeled together. Other measures of company self-regulation that capture
the structure or component parts of an internal compliance system (e.g.,
audits, ethics codes, hotlines) and its operation (e.g., formal reprimand,
fired) remain nonsignificant in model 6. Several control variables (i.e.,
desirability of the behavior, type of noncompliance, and business
experience, see Appendix VI) and a couple of risk factors (i.e., advancing
one’s career and perceived thrills) retain their significant effects.
Compared with model 5, however, being asked to offend by one’s
supervisor is no longer significant.
At this point, our results suggest that both formal legal and informal
(but business-salient) sanction threats can inhibit environmental
noncompliance. However, intra-organizational control mechanisms (such
as self-reporting, audits, or hotlines) do not directly affect noncompliance
when modeled alone or in conjunction with other regulatory levers for this
group of respondents. Importantly, none of the interventions appears to
substantially lessen the powerful influence of career benefits on offending
intentions.

108
A reviewer raised concerns about the large number of independent variables in the
model. Although we did not experience any difficulty fitting the models (e.g., perfect
prediction), we examined the variance inflation factor score for each variable in the analysis.
None exceeded 2.24 and most were below 2. See infra Appendix III, Table 3.
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One possible explanation for the continued importance of perceived
career benefits on offending is that the true relationship between regulatory
levers, benefits, and noncompliance is multiplicative instead of additive.
So we explored some likely interactions between variables drawing from
the extant literature. We expected, for instance, that people who strongly
believed the illegal act would benefit their careers would be less likely to be
deterred by potential formal legal proceedings109 and informal sanction
threats. Further analysis (not reported here) failed to reveal a significant
interaction between formal sanctions and perceived benefits to one’s career,
but we did discover a modest interaction (p < .07) between career benefit
and informal sanctions (see Table 3, model 7).110 For people who perceive
greater career advancement associated with the illegal act (compared with
those who perceive less benefit), informal sanctions matter less in
predicting offending likelihood.
Using predicted probabilities to
demonstrate, when the person perceives no career benefit, the probability of
offending decreases by 0.25 (from 0.31 to 0.06) as the perceived informal
sanctions increase from 1 SD below the mean to 1 SD above. When the
person ranks the likelihood that offending would advance his career as a 5
(out of a possible 10),111 the probability of offending only decreases by
0.171 (from 0.47 to 0.30) when perceived informal sanctions are increased
from 1 SD below the mean to 1 SD above. This implies that when a person
perceives a large career benefit, she is less likely to consider informal
sanctions before deciding to offend. The perceived benefit of illegal
behavior for this group appears to trump any anticipated loss of respect and
future harm to job prospects associated with the informal discovery that
promotes crime inhibition for others in the sample. Although this finding is
modest,112 it points out that some regulatory elements may be less salient
for managers who are more instrumentally oriented.
The empirical literature also suggests that regulatory interventions
might operate differently for “experienced” respondents. We ran models 1–
6 on a subset of scenarios in which the respondent reported personal
experience with the environmental conditions described in any of the
109

Both types of formal sanctions (threats directed at the firm and individual managers)
were analyzed for multiplicative effects.
110
To ease interpretation, the variables were mean-centered prior to creating the
interaction. Mean-centered values are reported in model 7. None of the firm self-regulatory
variables (e.g., elements and operation of an internal compliance system) interacted with
career benefit.
111
Only 13% of the sample ranked career benefits above a 5.
112
Model comparisons (with and without the interaction term) fail to show an improved
fit for the model with the interaction. However, the pseudo r2 for the model increases from
.36 to .37.
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scenarios (N = 177). While some coefficients dropped to nonsignificance
in these models (possibly due to the reduction in sample size), the overall
results were similar. There were not enough cases to run all six models on
the subsample of scenarios in which respondents reported no personal
experience (N = 60), but a likelihood-ratio test indicated that models 1–3
were not significantly different for respondents with personal experience
and those without.
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR REGULATORY STRATEGY
This research was conducted to learn more about corporate
environmental crime prevention-and-control strategies in the context of the
kinds of pushes and pulls toward crime that company managers may
experience. Specifically, we examined whether offending intentions would
be lessened in the presence of particular regulatory elements drawn from
cooperative and punitive intervention strategies. Although our sample of
respondents is nonrandom, a nontrivial number of managers in this study
reported a chance of offending under experimentally generated conditions
(N = 61, or 37.9% of the respondents). For this select group of managers,
certain crime prevention-and-control strategies are more successful than
others. For instance, the perceived certainty and severity of legal sanctions
that target responsible managers deter environmental wrongdoing. Thus, as
others have discovered,113 credible enforcement by the state inhibits
offending propensity for our respondents as well. Counter to expectations,
however, perceptions of the laws themselves (e.g., are they too strict or too
lenient?) are unrelated to intentions. Our managers appear neither defiant
(more apt to offend because the law is seen as unfair) nor willing to take
advantage of weak laws.
Our results also highlight the symbiosis between formal and informal
controls. Formal sanctions do not work in isolation. As Ayers and
Braithwaite suggest, salient legal consequences can buttress extralegal
controls.114 In effect, the threat of external enforcement adds an additional
layer of crime-control capacity for managers who are uninhibited by a
moral sense of right and wrong, by their understanding of how others
(including their colleagues) are likely to view their behavior, and by the
extent to which they think the discovery of these acts would bring shame on
themselves (i.e., informal sanction threats). Internal compliance systems
per se had no significant impact on behavioral intentions, nor did specific
outcomes associated with such systems, such as being internally
113

See Gunningham et al., supra note 30.
See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 8, at 150. These effects are additive and not
multiplicative. We did not find an interaction between formal and informal sanction threats.
114
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reprimanded or fired (relative to the firm doing nothing when transgressions
were discovered). However, most of these variables showed the expected
negative relationship with offending intentions and perhaps, given the
difficulties with small sample sizes and statistical power, would have
shown stronger effects had there been more respondents.
In general, the risk of environmental crime appears least likely when
there is a credible legal threat for noncompliance and/or when one
perceives informal consequences associated with offending, such as losing
the respect of one’s significant others, to be certain and costly. The
presence of these control mechanisms, however, does not negate some of
the more pernicious risk factors (i.e., career benefits or perceived thrills),
which remain significantly associated with noncompliance, especially in the
command-and-control models. Company self-regulation that draws on
informal social controls may be somewhat more effective at alleviating the
attractions of crime than deterrence-based interventions (as indicated by the
slightly diminished coefficient for career benefits in models 2, 4, and 6).
However, even with a full complement of control mechanisms, respondents
who perceive career benefits and thrills associated with offending are
significantly more likely to report offending proclivity. This is especially
true for those on the “high end” of perceived benefits—those for whom
intra-organizational discovery or stigma from family, friends, or business
associates appears to matter less (model 7). To affect these kinds of
offending risks, changes in company incentives for managers might be
needed. For instance, structuring internal rewards to prioritize a broader
measure of excellence (e.g., profits and compliance) over a simple focus on
the bottom line may persuade self-interested individuals to comply with the
law while pursuing career advancement.
Finally, across all seven models, respondents are significantly less
likely to violate environmental law when the act: (1) is perceived as likely
dangerous to humans and wildlife and (2) is viewed as undesirable. These
findings reinforce what sociologists have emphasized since Durkheim—
social norms influence how we behave.115 In this particular case, our
results highlight the importance of a human health and environmental
norm116 that—if replicated in a larger random sample—has policy
implications on its own merits. Knowing that individuals respond to
information about human health and environmental harms, announcements
about new environmental regulations and enforcement actions can be
framed around this message. If we know that certain types of violations are
viewed as more undesirable than others, it will be easier to justify targeting
115
116

Or, how we predict we will behave.
See Vandenbergh, supra note 51, at 59.
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these behaviors for more stringent enforcement while other, less serious
(and probably more common) acts, are better left to self-regulatory
measures. It would be a mistake, however, to assume that normative
sanctions alone will prevent minor violations. Braithwaite’s family model
and enforcement pyramid emphasize that norms must be reinforced by
moral authority.117 When norms fail, the government must be ready and
willing to intervene.
Although our results should be substantiated by further study, the
findings have implications for regulatory policy more broadly. First, both
informal sanctions and command-and-control strategies lower the
likelihood of corporate crime. The risk of corporate offending increases
when there is not a credible legal threat or when one’s duty to behave
ethically is not reinforced by colleagues or through fear of informal
sanctions. Second, the deterrent capacity of these control mechanisms does
not negate certain corporate or individual risk factors, which remain
significantly associated with noncompliance. This suggests that current
policy levers do not fully mitigate offending risks and may indicate that a
one-size-fits-all policy is shortsighted. Last, our research has several
implications for how regulators can frame environmental messages, utilize
scarce resources, and align regulatory levers with specific types of offenses.
Future research should untangle whether the processes and control
mechanisms we discovered in this study are similar for other types of
corporate crime.

117

See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 14.
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Appendix I
Vignette Dimensions and Levels
Variable Name
Vignette Type
RELEASE TOXINS

COMPLIANCE

Description
Significant Noncompliance: vignette
depicts scenario about discharging toxins
into a local waterway
Technical Noncompliance: vignette depicts
scenario about ignoring an EPA compliance
order [reference category]

Locus of Control
ASKED

Is asked by a higher level manager

ASKS

Mgr. asks an employee [reference category]

Firm EPA Volunteer Status
VOLUNTARY REDUCT
DECLINE

Volunteered to participate in an EPAsponsored pollution-reduction program
Was contacted by the EPA to participate in
a voluntary pollution-reduction program but
declined to do so [reference category]

Environmental Constraints
FOREIGN COMPETE

Losing ground to foreign competitors

ECONOMIC HEALTHY

Economically healthy [reference category]

ECON DETERIORATING

Economically deteriorating

Managerial Ethics
ETHICS GUIDE

Ethical considerations guide top
management hiring decisions, performance
evaluations, and promotions

ETHICS DISTINCT

Ethical considerations are considered
important, but distinct, from business
decisions

ETHICS IRRELEVANT

Ethical considerations are considered
mostly irrelevant to business decisions
[reference category]
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Management Location
MID-LEVEL MGR

A midlevel manager

UPPER-LEVEL MGR

An upper-level manager

Internal Compliance Structure
HOTLINE

A hotline in which violation of compliance
can be anonymously reported

ETHICS

Mandatory ethics training

AUDITS

Internal random environmental audits in
which violations of compliance can be
uncovered

SELF REPORT

Mandatory self-reporting to the EPA of
monthly release data

ETHICS CODE

An ethics code [reference category]

Internal Compliance Operation
NO ACTION

269

The firm took no action against an
employee who was discovered violating
environmental regulations [reference
category]

REPRIMANDED

The firm severely reprimanded an
employee who violated environmental
regulations

FIRED

The firm fired an employee who violated
environmental regulations

Note: All vignette dimensions take the value of 1 when they are present and 0 when they are
absent.
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Appendix II
Sample Scenarios
Environmental Violations
1. Lee, a middle-level manager at AmCorp, asks an employee to
ignore an environmental agency’s demand to act on a compliance
order. This practice is common in the firm. Lee believes that ignoring the
environmental agency’s demand may weaken the firm’s competitive
position.
AmCorp is a subsidiary of USA Corp, a publicly held U.S.-based firm
that promotes itself as a green company. USA Corp owns and operates one
fully integrated manufacturing facility in a large urban center. The facility,
which has been refurbished, is designated as a minor discharger according
to the EPA ranking system, with an environmental compliance record that
has exceeded regulatory compliance standards. Last year, USA Corp was
contracted by the EPA to participate in a voluntary pollution-reduction
program but declined to do so.
USA Corp is currently experiencing declining sales and revenues in an
industry that is economically healthy.
At USA Corp, ethical considerations are considered mostly irrelevant
to business decisions. The firm has mandatory ethics training but the firm
took no action against an employee who was discovered violating
environmental regulations.
2. Lee, a low-level manager at AmCorp, is asked by a supervisor to
discharge toxins into a local waterway that exceeded permitted levels
by 200%. This practice is common in the firm. Lee believes that
discharging toxins into a local waterway may strengthen the firm’s
competitive position.
AmCorp is a publicly held U.S.-based firm that promotes itself as a
green company. AmCorp owns and operates one fully integrated
manufacturing facility in a large urban center. The facility, which is over
20 years old, is designated as a minor discharger according to the EPA
ranking system with an environmental compliance record that has exceeded
regulatory compliance standards. Last year, AmCorp volunteered to
participate in an EPA-sponsored pollution-reduction program.
AmCorp is currently experiencing declining sales and revenues in an
industry that is losing ground to foreign competitors.
At AmCorp, ethical considerations guide top management hiring
decisions, performance evaluations, and promotions. The firm has an ethics
code and the firm severely reprimanded an employee who recently violated
environmental regulations.
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Appendix III
Table 1
NIJ Participating and Nonparticipating Firms, 1995–2000
Nonparticipants
N = 71 a

Participant 1

Participant 2

Mean # of facilities

3.27 (2.29)

16.83

6.00

Mean # of
employees

14,296.87

102,816

22,388

(16015.81)
36,018.39
(100,943.06)

9,515,200,000

17,933

0.94

2

0

0.83

0.50

17.33

30.83

19.67

13.67

1.03

5.14

1.17

2.28

Mean total
stockholders’ equity
# of informal
sanctions per year

(1.56)

# of formal
sanctions per year

(1.64)

# of violations per
year
# of inspections per
year
Yearly violation rate
per average # of
facilities
Yearly inspection
rate per average # of
facilities
a

0.84
12.04
(13.21)
4.55
(3.47)
5.26
(9.74)
1.57
(1.15)

Due to missing data, the sample sizes used to compute descriptive statistics for the
variables number of employees and total stockholder equity were N = 69 and N = 65,
respectively.
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Table 2
Comparing TMone Respondents to Nonrespondents, Excluding
Undelivered Surveys (N = 411)a
# of Respondents
(%)

# of Nonrespondents
(%)

Type of Professionb
Environmentally Related
Profession

37 (80.4)

278 (77.2)

Not Environmental

9 (19.6)

82 (22.8)

Total

46 (100)

360 (100)

Profit-Oriented Business (Not
Including Consulting)

3 (6.5)

73 (20.4)

Government Agency

1 (2.1)

11 (3.1)

NGO or Civic Association

14 (30.4)

104 (29.1)

Law Firm

1 (2.1)

12 (3.4)

Private Consulting Firm

27 (58.7)

155 (43.4)

Other

0 (0.0)

2 (0.6)

Total

46

357

Male

26 (60.5)

226 (69.3)

Female

17 (39.5)

100 (30.7)

Total

43 (100)

326 (100)

Type of Businessb

b

Gender

Average Number of Employees
14.04
9.59
Per Companyc
Note: Totals may not add up to N = 411 as some individuals’ information was not
given in enough detail to categorize. Also, percentages may not up to 100% due to
rounding.
a
One respondent responded to the survey, but also was listed as having his or her
survey notification letter returned. We assumed the latter coding was in error so this
individual was included as a respondent in the above analyses.
b
Pearson Chi-square tests indicated that there were no significant differences
between respondents and nonrespondents by Type of Profession, Type of Business, or
Gender.
c
An independent-samples t-test showed a significant difference in company size
by response status, p < .01
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Variance Inflation Scores, Full Model
Variable

VIF

1/VIF

Zinformal sanctions

2.24

0.447264

Original sample

2.1

0.47633

Informal sanctions

1.86

0.539082

CareerXinformal sanctions

1.84

0.543545

Danger to life

1.76

0.569553

Advance career

1.68

0.596472

Ethics training

1.67

0.599498

Fired

1.65

0.604242

Audits

1.64

0.611286

Reprimand

1.62

0.616837

Self-report

1.6

0.626457

Ethics distinct

1.49

0.671535

Adequacy of law

1.47

0.682192

Ethics guide mgt.

1.46

0.68455

Hotline

1.42

0.705503

Foreign competition

1.41

0.709856

Economic deteriorate

1.4

0.714221

Situation real
Years of business
experience

1.37

0.73174

1.31

0.763621

Release toxins

1.26

0.794501

Personal experience

1.26

0.794955

Conditional compliance

1.26

0.796812

Voluntary reduction

1.23

0.813388

Desirability of behavior

1.22

0.821074

Thrill

1.19

0.84052

Asked

1.11

0.900475

Mid-level Manager

1.08

0.923981

Mean VIF

1.5
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Appendix IV
Description of Variables
Variable

Variable Definition

Scoring and Descriptive
Characteristics

Dependent Variable
Act as
manager

What is the chance that you would
act as the manager did under these
circumstances?

Control Variables
Scenario depicts significant
noncompliance (i.e., discharging
Toxins
toxins) as opposed to technical
vignette
noncompliance (i.e., ignore EPA
order).
11 point mean score scale composed
of two items:
1) What is the chance the behavior
described in the scenario will
Danger to life
endanger human life?
2) What is the chance the behavior
described in the scenario will
endanger aquatic/wildlife?
Regardless of what you would do, is
Realistic
the situation described in this
scenario
scenario believable or realistic?

1 = 10% or more chance of
noncompliance (29.67%)
0 = 0% chance of noncompliance
(70.33%)
1 = Significant Noncompliance
(52.85%)
0 = Technical Noncompliance
(47.15%)

0 (no chance at all) to 10 (100%
chance)
(M = 6.76, SD = 2.57)

1 = Yes (65.04%)
0 = No (34.96%)

Desirability
of behavior

Please rate this behavior according
to its desirability.

0 (not at all desirable) to 10 (very
desirable)
(M = .80, SD = 1.85)

Years
business
experience

Years of business experience.

(M = 27.05, SD = 9.75)

Personal
experience*

NIJ sample: Have you personally
experienced or known about
situations similar to those described
in the scenarios?
TMone sample: If you have ever
worked in publicly or privately
owned business, have you
personally experienced situations
similar to those described in the
scenarios?

1 = Yes (74.68%)
0 = No (25.32%)

Original
sample

Was the respondent part of the
original NIJ study?

1 = Yes (51.22%)
0 = No (48.78%)

Situational Risk
Asked

Manager in the scenario is asked by
a higher level manager to engage in
violating behavior.

1 = Manager is asked by higher
level employee (52.44%)
0 = Manager asks an employee
(47.56%)
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Variable

Variable Definition

Scoring and Descriptive
Characteristics

Midlevel
manager

Scenario depicts a midlevel
manager.

1 = Midlevel manager (52.03%)
0 = Upper-level manager (47.97%)

Economically
deteriorating
Foreign
competition

Industry described in scenario is
economically deteriorating (versus
economically healthy).
Industry described in scenario is
losing ground to foreign competitors
(versus economically healthy).

1 = Yes (28.86%)
0 = No (71.14%)
1 = Yes (36.18%)
0 = No (63.82%)

Individual Risk
Advance
career
Thrill

Conditional
compliance*

How much would it advance your
career if you did what the manager
did under these circumstances?
How exciting or thrilling would it
be for you if you did what the
manager did under the
circumstances?
Extent to which respondent agrees
with the statement: “An individual
should comply with the law so long
as it does not go against what s/he
thinks is right.”

0 (no chance at all) to 10 (100%
chance)
(M = 1.79, SD = 2.58)
0 (not exciting) to 10 (very exciting)
(M = 0.43, SD = 1.34)

0 (do not agree) to 10 (strongly
agree) (M = 2.95, SD = 3.75)

Company Self-Regulation

Voluntary
reduction

Ethics guide
management

Ethics are
distinct
Random
audits
Selfreporting

Scenario depicts a firm that
volunteered to participate in an
EPA-sponsored pollution-reduction
program.
The scenario depicts a firm in which
ethical considerations guide top
management hiring decisions,
performance evaluations, and
promotions.
The scenario depicts a firm in which
ethical considerations are
considered important, but distinct,
from business decisions.
The scenario depicts a firm which
uses internal random environmental
audits to uncover violations of
compliance.
The firm described in the scenario
has been mandated to report
monthly release data to the EPA.

1 = Firm volunteered to participate
in an EPA-sponsored reduction
program (51.63%)
0 = Firm was contacted by the EPA
to participate in a voluntary
reduction program but declined to
do so (48.37%)
1 = Yes (32.93%)
0 = No (67.07%)

1 = Yes (35.37%)
0 = No (64.63%)
1 = Yes (23.17%)
0 = No (76.83%)
1 = Yes (18.29%)
0 = No (81.71%)
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Variable
Ethics
training
Hotline

Fired

Reprimand

Informal
sanctions

SALLY S. SIMPSON, ET AL.
Variable Definition
The scenario depicts a firm that
mandates ethics training for
employees.
The scenario depicts a firm that uses
a hotline in which violations of
compliance can be anonymously
reported.
The firm depicted in the scenario
fired an employee who violated
environmental regulations (versus
the firm took no action).
The firm depicted in the scenario
severely reprimanded an employee
who violated environmental
regulations (versus the firm took no
action).
Informal sanction cost scale: 3 items
on the certainty/severity of losing
respect of business associates, loss
of job, and loss of future job
prospects. We multiplied the
certainty and severity of each item
by each other as well as by the
chance that the behavior would
become known within the firm, then
summed those three scores. This
scale was also normalized.

Command and Control
Formal sanction cost scale: 5 items
about the certainty/severity of
Formal
civil/criminal prosecution of the
sanctions
individual as well as the certainty of
a regulatory investigation.
Adequacy of
laws

How adequate is the law governing
this behavior?

[Vol. 103

Scoring and Descriptive
Characteristics
1 = Yes (20.33%)
0 = No (79.67%)
1 = Yes (12.20%)
0 = No (87.80%)
1 = Yes (36.18%)
0 = No (63.82%)

1 = Yes (32.52%)
0 = No (67.48%)

(M = 0, SD = 1)

(M = .05, SD = .99)

0 (too strict) to 10 (too lenient)
(M = 3.88, SD = 2.21)

*Demographic or attitudinal information collected from each respondent.
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Appendix V
Comparison of Significant Variables Between TMone
and NIJ Samples
TMone Sample (N = 111)
B
(Robust SE)
Odds Ratio

NIJ Sample (N = 126)
B
(Robust SE)
Odds Ratio

-1.92 (0.52)***
0.15
0.18 (0.11)
1.20
-0.03 (0.03)
0.97
0.10 (0.08)
1.10
0.48 (0.13)***
1.61
-0.99 (0.36)***
0.37
-0.10 (0.35)
0.90
0.34

-0.00 (.53)
1.00
0.31 (.12)**
1.36
-0.01 (.03)
0.99
0.40 (.13)***
1.48
0.90 (.57)
2.45
-.44 (.40)
0.65
-.67 (.30)**
0.51
0.37

Control variables
Release toxins
Desirability of behavior
Years business experience
Career
Thrill
Informal sanctions
Formal sanctions
Pseudo r2
Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01
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Appendix VI
Regression Coefficients of Control Variables
Model 1:
Risk Factors

B (Robust SE)

B

(Robust SE)

Model 2:
Informal
Sanctions
B (Robust SE)

Odds Ratio
-0.91 (0.31)***
0.40
-0.13 (0.06)**
0.88
0.30 (0.13)**
1.36
-0.04 (0.01)**
0.96
-0.04 (0.41)
0.95
0.05 (0.41)
1.05

Odds Ratio
-1.04 (.36)***
0.35
-.16 (.07)**
0.85
.29 (.09)***
1.34
-.04 (.02)*
0.96
-.44 (.43)
0.64
-.06 (.48)
0.94

Odds Ratio
-1.21 (.36)***
0.30
-.04 (.08)
0.96
.28 (.08)***
1.33
-.04 (.02)*
0.96
-.62 (.44)
0.54
-.18 (.49)
0.84

Odds Ratio
-1.18 (.38)***
0.31
-.18 (.07)***
0.83
.28 (.10)***
1.32
-.05 (.02)**
0.95
-.52 (.45)
0.60
-.18 (.49)
0.83

-0.84 (0.43)
0.43

-.41 (.51)
0.66

.36 (.56)
1.30

-.51 (.52)
0.60

0.15

0.27

0.33

0.29

Model 6:
Full Model

Model 7:
Interactions

Only Controls

Control
variables
Release Toxins
Danger to Life
Desirability of
Behavior
Years Business
Experience
Realistic
Scenario
Personal
Experience
Original
Sample (NIJ
Sample)
Pseudo r2

Model 3:
Self-Regulation
B

(Robust SE)

Continued
Model 4:
Self-Regulation
and Informal

Control
variables
Release Toxins
Danger to Life

B

(Robust SE)
Odds Ratio

-1.28 (.39)***
0.28
-.06 (.08)
0.95
.28 (.09)***
1.32
-.04 (.02)**
0.96
-.69 (.45)
0.50
-.26 (.50)
0.77

Desirability of
Behavior
Years Business
Experience
Realistic
Scenario
Personal
experience
Original
.15 (.57)
Sample (NIJ
1.16
Sample)
2
0.35
Pseudo r
Note: *p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01

Model 5:
Command and
Control
B

(Robust SE)
Odds Ratio

B

(Robust SE)
Odds Ratio

B

(Robust SE)
Odds Ratio

-.88 (.38)**
0.41
-.05 (.08)
0.95
.32 (.10)***
1.38
-.04 (.02)*
0.96
-.57 (.44)
0.56
-.21 (.48)
0.81

-1.14 (.41)***
0.32
-.01 (.08)
0.99
.30 (.09)***
1.35
-.05 (.02)**
0.95
-.76 (.46)
0.47
-.36 (.49)
0.70

-1.14 (.41)***
0.32
-.01 (.09)
1.01
.32 (.09)***
1.38
-.05 (.02)**
0.95
-.77 (.45)*
0.46
-.23 (.49)
0.80

-.27 (.55)
0.76

.14 (.56)
1.15

.13 (.53)
1.14

0.31

0.36

0.37

